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Abstract
Internationalization theories from economics and international business disciplines suggest that products are launched,
and production facilities established, sequentially in industrialized, newly industrialized, and finally, in developing countries.
From a firm level perspective, operations management researchers have proposed descriptive models of generic roles of
international factories. But little has appeared in the economics, international business, or operations management literature
that compares these two views or provides much empirical evidence to support divergent claims. In this paper, we compare
both perspectives and shed insight into factory roles through a detailed examination of data on plant practices and
performance in the global picture tube industry. Our analysis suggests that existing theory and descriptive models do not
possess enough explanatory power to adequately predict or describe the dynamics of product and production loci today. We
highlight the need for a new theory by contrasting today’s global business realities with those of yesteryears. q 1998
Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The primary purposes of this paper are to inform
researchers and managers of some of the shortcom-
ings of traditional management theory as it applies to
global manufacturing, and to provide a richer under-
standing of current global manufacturing manage-
ment practices. Through the use of secondary indus-
try data and primary plant-level manufacturing data
from the global color picture tube industry, we argue
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that a key theory of international business, the inter-
nationalization process model—which comprises the
Žinternational product lifecycle model Vernon, 1966,
.1979 and the Uppsala internationalization model
Ž .Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 1990 —does not ade-
quately explain current industry manufacturing prac-
tices. We frame our discussion and results within the
relevant literature in global manufacturing strategy
Ž .e.g., Ferdows, 1989 and the strategic typologies
Žand taxonomies literature e.g., Miles and Snow,
.1978; Miller and Roth, 1994 . This approach permits
us to link the relevant international business and
operations management literatures, and illustrate
shortcomings of both the theory of the former and
the descriptive models of the latter.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 1
presents an overview of the relevant literature. The-
ory based predictions are stated and subsequently
tested. Section 2 describes the research design and
methodology. Results are presented in Section 3
based on cluster analysis, regional comparisons,
comparisons of performance and practices across
plant roles, and the canonical functions that explain
and predict the clusters of plant roles. A discussion
of our results is provided in Section 4, and conclu-
sions are given in Section 5.
1.1. Background
One of the key theories that seeks to explain and
predict globalization is the theory of foreign direct
Ž . Žinvestment FDI see Melin, 1992 for a classifica-
.tion of globalization theories . FDI theory suggests
that investments in foreign countries are a function
of the nature of the advantages that multinational
Ž .corporations MNCs expect they will realize by
investing outside their home borders. The field has
broadly come to accept the notion that such advan-
Žtages accrue from ownership e.g., technology, skills,
. Žpatents , location e.g., natural resources, low-cost
.labor, transportation , and the ability to internally
Žleverage capabilities Hymer, 1976; Vernon, 1974;
.Kojima, 1978, 1982; Dunning, 1988 . An important
element of this theory, one that we use in this paper,
focuses on the dynamic process of internationaliza-
Ž .tion Melin, 1992 . Two oft-cited and closely related
models of internationalization are the international
Ž . Žproduct lifecycle model IPLC Vernon, 1966, 1971,
.1974, 1979 and the Uppsala internationalization
Ž .process model Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 1990 .
Although developed in the 1960s and 1970s, and
questioned as to their explanatory power as early as
Ž .1981 Vernon, 1981, pp. 519, 520 , both models still
Žexert considerable influence on the field Melin,
.1992 .
The IPLC model focuses on the location of pro-
duction activities in a global market in the context of
technological know-how, demand, scale economies,
Ž .and labor costs Vernon, 1966, p. 190 . It presents an
individual firm’s perspective of international invest-
ment theory, one that is based on the product lifecy-
cle. The introduction stage is domestic, having its
orientation in the country where the product was
Ž .developed generally industrialized . Exports to other
industrialized countries may support scale economies.
During the growth stage, exports increase, and for-
eign investments in manufacturing plants are made
in countries with an expanding demand for the prod-
uct. In the maturity stage, when major markets are
saturated and the product standardized, manufactur-
ing is relocated to countries with low labor costs
Žgenerally, newly industrialized countries—NICs—
.and developing countries . Finally, in the stage of
decline, manufacturing, and in some cases even de-
mand, leaves the industrial country which was home
Ž .to the original innovation Vernon, 1966 .
The Uppsala internationalization process model
supplements the IPLC model by theorizing about the
process of internationalization in the context of mar-
ket presence, not just in the context of production.
The logical steps of international behavior are simi-
lar to the stages of the IPLC model, going through
acquisition, integration, and use of knowledge about
Žforeign markets and operations Johanson and
.Vahlne, 1977 . For individual firms, the key is to
Ž .reduce the ‘psychic’ distance Melin, 1992, p. 103
by first taking on familiar and close-by markets so as
Žto minimize perceived market uncertainty Johanson
.and Vahlne, 1990 .
The basic question we raise in this paper is
whether the IPLC and Uppsala internationalization
Žmodels henceforth, collectively referred to as IPUP
.models are still valid today. The world has changed
in a number of fundamental ways since these models
were developed: communism has collapsed; global
operations are the norm in many industries; 2 there
are striking similarities today between N. American,
European, and Japanese outward flows of FDI con-
sidering how different they were only a few years
Ž .ago Ohmae, 1985; Dunning, 1988 ; and, countries
as diverse as China, Poland, Korea, Singapore, and
Taiwan have made dramatic economic progress in
the last decade. In addition, global coordination and
networking have improved tremendously in the past
Ž .few years Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Taylor, 1991 .
2 For example, the applicability of the IPLC model appears to
be limited if new products are developed in companies that
Žalready have considerable operations in foreign countries see
.Vernon, 1979; Melin, 1992, p. 103 .
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Do the IPUP models hold true in this era of global
factory networks where each factory may have a
unique mission and role, and where the political,
technological, and economic landscape has changed
so much?
1.2. The internationalization models applied to man-
ufacturing operations
While there has been substantial research on the
nature of internationalization, there has been only a
limited effort to translate this into implications for
manufacturing strategy and decision-making, possi-
bly because of the dominance of economists among
international business researchers, and also possibly
because of the traditionally ‘passive’ nature of man-
Žufacturing in a business unit’s strategy Hayes and
Wheelwright, 1984, p. 396, suggest that in most
companies, manufacturing has only a passive role—
Stages 1 and 2—and that there are very few compa-
.nies that are in Stage 3 or 4 . Yet, an important
aspect of manufacturing strategy is the notion that
global and business strategy lead to a functional
manufacturing strategy, which in turn leads to partic-
Žular actions and practices Skinner, 1969; Wheel-
wright, 1978; Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984; Hamel
and Prahalad, 1985; Anderson et al., 1989; Hill,
.1989 .
The logic of the IPUP models implies that plants
Žlocated in leading industrialized countries US, Eu-
.rope ought to excel at innovation, frequently bring-
ing out new products and processes. Plants in other
industrialized countries can be expected to be good
at managing and stabilizing technology and pro-
cesses. The model also suggests that plants in the
NICs can be expected to be average on process
performance, but lag on innovation. Finally, compa-
nies and plants in developing and least developed
Ž .countries LDCs can be expected to be low per-
formers on virtually every dimension, except possi-
bly cost.
The above brief classification of factory manufac-
turing emphasis and performance is restated as pre-
dictions of regional plant manufacturing practices.
IPUP Prediction 1a: North American and leading
Ž .European plants by location will excel at innova-
tion; NIC plants will be averaged on process man-
agement and performance, and lagging on innova-
tion; LDC plants will be low performers.
IPUP Prediction 1b: Plants in the US, Europe, and
Japan will be equally sophisticated on technology
practices. NIC plants will lag US, European, and
Japanese plants on both technology and management
practices.
1.3. Plant roles in MNCs
Both strategy and operations management re-
searchers suggest that a business unit’s manufactur-
ing role ought to be consistent with its business and
manufacturing strategy and that organizational units
may be assigned different roles for strategic reasons.
ŽSee, e.g., Miller and Friesen, 1977 and Miles and
Snow, 1978 for research on strategic archetypes, or
Skinner, 1974; Richardson et al., 1985; Miller and
.Roth, 1994 for a more operations-driven perspective .
Here, to facilitate our analysis, we adopt Miller and
Roth’s operations strategy typology, since it is one
that comes closest to being applicable at the level of
the factory. Their taxonomy includes ‘innovators’,
‘marketeers’, and ‘caretakers’. ‘Innovators’ have a
superior ability to introduce new products and make
design changes, excel at both conformance quality
and product performance, and do not emphasize
price as much as other groups. Given their emphasis
on short product lifecycles, such business units
demonstrate the characteristics of startup firms, in
the early stages of the product lifecycle. ‘Marke-
teers’ emphasize a variety of market-oriented capa-
bilities such as broad distribution, broad product line,
speed, after-sales service and volume flexibility,
though they also excel at conformance quality and
product performance, and are moderately price con-
scious. They pursue manufacturing strategies charac-
teristic of businesses in more mature phases of the
lifecycle; thus, there is a greater emphasis on manu-
facturing process reliability, quality control, and on-
going improvement. Finally, ‘caretakers’ generally
cater only to the minimum standards of competition
and focus on low price. They act as if they are in the
declining stages of the product lifecycle.
The above classification of strategic roles can be
mapped on to the description of the IPUP models of
the internationalization process which leads us to our
second IPUP prediction.
( )A. Khurana, B. TalbotrJournal of Operations Management 16 1998 215–239218
Fig. 1. Generic roles of international factories.
IPUP Prediction 2: US, Japanese, and leading Euro-
Ž .pean plants by location will be ‘innovators’, other
Ž .industrialized country plants and some in NICs will
be ‘marketeers’, while some NIC and developing
country plants will be ‘caretakers’.
A second relevant stream of research focuses on
multiplant networks, and the assignment of different
Žroles in such networks for a discussion of foreign
subsidiary roles, see Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989, p.
. 3 Ž .98 . For example, Ferdows 1989 presents a
framework for international factory networks as an
extension of the notions of multiple and evolving
plant roles. He suggests that the strategic role of
international factories can be defined on the basis of
Ž .two dimensions: i the primary reason for establish-
Ž .ing the site, and ii the extent of technical activities
performed at the site. This leads to six generic roles
for international factories, as shown in Fig. 1 below.
Ferdows posits that these roles evolve over time
such that ‘off-shore’ factories become ‘source’ facto-
ries, ‘servers’ become ‘contributors’, and both
‘source’ and ‘contributors’ ultimately become ‘lead’
factories, though that is not necessarily desirable. If
we combine Ferdows’ model with the IPUP model,
we can argue that most MNCs would prefer to locate
3 While the assignment of different subsidiary and plant roles in
a network itself is interesting, multiplant and inter-subsidiary
coordination within a network is also likely to influence the
manner in which such roles are assigned and evolved. For exam-
ple, even in a domestic setting, a multiplant study of food
establishments revealed that gaps in performance result from a
Ž .lack of interplant exchange and coordination Chew et al., 1989 .
Such coordination is difficult in the global setting; even the
apparently simple exercise of transfer of best practices is not easy
Ž .Szulanski, 1995 .
‘lead’ factories in their home countries, and would
establish sites in other countries as the product be-
comes more international. Plants in these ‘other’
countries would play different roles, depending on
their location, and the timing in the product lifecycle
Ž .Vernon, 1966 .
These arguments lead to more predictions.
IPUP Prediction 3a: Most ‘lead’ factories will be
located in the home countries of US, Japanese, and
leading European plants.
IPUP Prediction 3b: ‘Contributors’r‘source’ facto-
ries will generally be located in ‘non-home’ coun-
tries of advanced industrialized countries, and in
some NICs.
IPUP Prediction 3c: Most ‘offshore’ factories will
be located in LDCs and NICs; ‘contributor’ factories
will not follow any consistent pattern of location.
1.4. Research issues and approach
The above review of the literature and our argu-
ments about the form that global manufacturing is
expected to take enable us to state the core IPUP
prediction.
Core Prediction: The IPUP models, as applied to
global manufacturing, will explain factory practices
and plant roles in different regions.
The basic approach we take to evaluate the rele-
vance of the internationalization models is to analyze
Ž .whether: a there are regional differences in perfor-
mance and practices as predicted by the IPUP mod-
Ž .els; b the global distribution of plant roles is con-
Ž .sistent with the IPUP models; and c the global
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Ž .distribution of plant roles i.e., ‘home’ vs. ‘away’ is
consistent with the IPUP models and Ferdows’
model.
When measuring plant ‘strategy’, we weigh the
Žpros and cons of using ‘strategy as intent’ planned
. Ž .behavior Mintzberg, 1992 or ‘strategy as action’
Ž . Ž .actual behavior Wrapp, 1967; Mintzberg, 1978 .
While strategic plans are important for understanding
the dynamic nature of plant roles, they are a vision
for the future, and do not reflect current practice.
Mintzberg and others suggest that it is managerial
action, not merely managerial intent, that reflects an
Ž .organization’s realized as opposed to planned
strategic emphasis. Though we lean towards ‘strategy
as action’, we recognized that in our context, plant
roles are best measured both by ‘observed’ and
‘intended’ behavior. Thus, we analyze measures of
competitive priorities as well as factory practices.
1.5. An industry-focused study
The empirical data used for this paper come from
a larger study of industry practices and competitive-
Žness in the global color picture tube industry Details
.are given in Section 2.1 . This industry was chosen
for a number of reasons: it is an important and
mature global industry that has not been studied
extensively, which is facing a major technological
discontinuity in the form of flat panel displays.
Further, given the emergence of Japanese manufac-
turing organizations as world class manufacturers
Ž .Womack et al., 1990 , our intent was to select an
industry in which there was a significant Japanese
manufacturing presence.
One question that needs to be addressed is why an
industry study and not a cross-sectional study? We
cite two major reasons for our choice, similar to
Ž .those cited by Garvin 1988 in his study of the air
conditioning industry. The first is that cross-sectional
studies are often confounded by industry-specific
factors, and thus require a larger sample size for the
same statistical power. Second, an in-depth industry
study enabled us to understand the industry, pro-
cesses, and management practices in considerable
detail, and permitted us to gain an understanding of
specific company and plant level strategies. Yet, an
industry study also has weaknesses, with question-
able generalizability being the key shortcoming. Short
of executing a massive cross-sectional and time se-
ries study we cannot make rigorous claims about
generality. However, based on our understanding of
the industry context, we feel confident that our re-
sults are generalizable to similar mature, technologi-
Ž .cally sophisticated industries Khurana, 1994 .
2. Research methods
This section gives a brief overview of the research
approach. Specifically, we describe the industry, our
research design, the approach to the analysis under-
taken for this paper, a description of the respondents
and the basic data, and finally, the key measures
used in this paper.
2.1. Industry context
Ž .Picture tubes or cathode ray tubes CRTs are the
display devices used for television, computer moni-
Žtors, radar screens, and medical display screens such
.as X-ray or ultrasound screens , and have been in
Ž .commercial use since the late 1920s Keller, 1991 .
A mature product, picture tubes have passed through
Žthe basic technology and product lifecycles see, e.g.,
Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Suarez and Utter-
.back, 1995 . Round tubes, rectangular tubes, large
size tubes using stronger materials—the industry has
Žseen it all see Khurana, 1994 for details on picture
.tube evolution . The product lifecycle has also gone
through its paces, especially in the US and Europe,
Ž .with the initial era of startup 1949–1960 , followed
Ž .by the era of growth 1961–1975 , and the current
Ž .era of maturity 1976–current , with some people
arguing that the next technological discontinuity has
already occurred, with the increasing use of flat-panel
displays. Yet, this industry continues to be innova-
tive on both product and process. The existence of
these product and process lifecycle phases is sup-
ported by observing the distribution of the number
Ž .and ownership of tube manufacturing firms in the
US from fewer than 10 immediately after W.W.II
Ž .all American owned , to a peak of over 60 in 1957
Ž .American and foreign owned , to fewer than 10
Ž . Žtoday none American owned Suarez and Utter-
.back, 1995; Khurana, 1994 .
Simultaneously, as the product lifecycle was pro-
gressing, there was also a diffusion of the technol-
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ogy, industry practices, and manufacturing capabili-
ties across the world, not inconsistent with Vernon’s
traditional international product lifecycle model
Ž .Vernon, 1966 . Thus, whereas the initial develop-
ments took place in the US, subsequent develop-
ments spread quickly to Europe, with firms such as
Philips, Siemens and Nokia joining the competition
in the 1950s. Japanese companies such as Sony,
Matsushita, and Toshiba entered the market some-
what later, in the late 1960s and 1970s. Global
maturity was achieved in the late 1970s. During this
Ž .last phase late 1970s , manufacturing capabilities
were critical, and firms that were unable to maintain
manufacturing quality and product design perfor-
mance, or failed to invest in critical manufacturing
technologies, did not survive. Thus, most of the
surviving companies today, e.g., Sony, Matsushita,
Philips, Thomson, and Toshiba, have a strong manu-
facturing focus.
Today, the global color picture tube industry is in
its mature phase, marked by cut-throat competition
Žin fact, the industry seems to be following the path
followed by the TV industry, with only a lag of a
.few years . The main players are European, Japanese,
and Korean. There are fewer than 65 color picture
tube factories and fewer than 30 key companies in
the whole world that manufacture color picture tubes.
Of these, 10 factories are in China and the ex-USSR
Žat the time this study was initiated in 1992, these
facilities were explicitly excluded from the study
because of political and economic turmoil and the
consequent inaccessibility of the plants. Between
1993–1995, we have been able to obtain data from
.some of these plants . Also, the industry values
world class manufacturing practices, and we have
observed that most companies and factories have
been committed to quality and world class standards.
Our investigation uncovered the fact that nearly 35
factories have been closed during the past decade as
a result of industry restructuring caused by the entry
of more efficient Japanese and Korean factories.
2.2. Research design
This research was conducted in three phases. In
Phase One, a detailed study of quality and factory
management approaches at one picture tube com-
pany was carried out. Both quantitative data from
company and factory archives, and qualitative data
Žbased on interviews with more than 30 managers,
.engineers, and supervisors were analyzed for both
strategic and operational issues. Secondary data were
Žalso collected and analyzed. In Phase Two 1992–
.1993 , we visited 10 color picture tube factories in
N. America, Europe, and Japan, and in 1994 we
visited eight plants in E. Europe, China, and India. A
semi-structured questionnaire was used during these
site visits to compare practices, identify trends, and
develop items for the subsequent mail survey. In
Ž .Phase Three 1993–1994 , a detailed study of quality
and manufacturing practices in the color picture tube
industry was executed using four detailed mail ques-
Žtionnaires one each for the plant, production, qual-
.ity, and engineering manager at each plant that were
designed on the basis of prior research and the field
interviews. A total of 48 out of 53 extant plants in
the noncommunist countries responded to the ques-
tionnaires, giving a 91% population response, thus
making it a near-census of the industry. Subse-
quently, in mid-1994, we obtained access to several
of the plants in Eastern Europe and China, and data
from another eight color picture tube factories in
Eastern Europe, China, and ex-USSR were obtained.
Thus, we now have data from 54 factories worldwide
Ž .of a total of 63 known existing factories .
2.3. Analysis approach
Much of the evidence presented in this paper is
based on data collected in phase three of our re-
search, though wherever necessary, evidence is pre-
sented from our field studies. We execute the data
analysis for this paper in five steps. First, regional
comparisons on several dimensions are carried out
Ž .Section 3.2 . Prediction 1 is tested using these re-
sults. Second, we empirically define plant roles based
on the competitive priorities described by the plants
Ž .using cluster analysis Section 3.1 . The cluster anal-
ysis-derived plant roles are cross-validated with our
field studies’ results. Comparisons of plant strategy,
Žperformance both end and intermediate measures
.are included , and management practices for the
Ždifferent plant role clusters are presented Section
.3.3 . Third, we use a canonical discriminant analysis
to describe the two key discriminant functions that
Žexplain the basis for the above clustering Section
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.3.4 . Our fourth step is to compare the distribution of
these plant role clusters by region, both by factory
Ž .location and ownership Section 3.5 . This analysis
reveals facts about the manner in which different
regions use factories in different roles. This analysis
enables us to test for Prediction 2. Prediction 3 is
also partially tested with these results. Fifth, we
carry out the same analysis for plants in the ‘home’
Ž .country vs. those not in the ‘home’ country ‘away’
to understand how different companies assign and
Ž .use plant roles Section 3.5 .
2.4. Respondents
We initially defined the population for our re-
search as all color picture tube factories outside of
Žthe ex-communist bloc countries China, ex-USSR,
.and E. Europe . Black-and-white, monitor-only, and
tube salvage manufacturers were excluded. This left
53 factories belonging to 23 companies located in
more than 20 countries. The five non-responding
factories belong to two Japanese companies and one
European company. Secondary data on plant size,
company size, ownership, location, and product mix
for these five factories and companies did not reveal
any systematic bias, either at the company level, or
Ž .at the plant level chi-square test was not significant .
An important question that we raised early in the
research was whether plants belonging to the same
company were indeed different, statistically and oth-
erwise. Most of the managers that we interviewed,
especially the non-Japanese managers, saw major
differences in how the plants within their company
were operated and managed. For Japanese plants, the
Žgeneral opinion among managers and academics
familiar with Japanese manufacturing management
.whom the authors interviewed , was that plants lo-
cated in Japan and belonging to the same company
were likely to be quite similar in their management
policies, though they would have different kinds of
production equipment of different ages, and manu-
facture different generations of products or tube sizes.
ŽOur analysis of basic descriptive data using
.ANOVA from the Japanese plants reveals that plants
even within the same company are different, not only
on the level and type of production equipment au-
tomation, product types, and the individual plant
experiences with the introduction of automation, but
also on performance parameters and factory practices
Ž .F-value is not significant for performance variables .
This confirms our contention that plants in multi-plant
business units are statistically independent, which
permits subsequent statistical analysis using the fac-
tory as a unit of analysis. This result is also consis-
tent with what we observed as real differences on
factory visits.
2.5. Key measures for this study
Four key sets of measures are used for this paper.
The first set of measures assess the plant’s competi-
tiÕe priorities. The key competitive priorities se-
lected for this analysis are quality, flexibility, price,
productrprocess innovation, and future leadership in
innovation. Other priorities such as delivery, depend-
ability, speed, and after-sales service were consid-
ered, but dropped since our interviews indicated they
are not important differentiators in this industry.
Additive scales are used for quality, innovations, and
future leadership in innovation; single-item scales
Žare used for flexibility and price. Quality QUAL-
. ŽITY is an aggregate construct thus, a test such as
Cronbach’s alpha was not considered appropriate or
.necessary measured as the average of five question-
Ž .naire items, all 5-point scales: i Top management
Ž .emphasis on quality as a key priority, ii Priority
Ž .rank for tube design performance, iii Priority rank
Ž .for conformance quality, iv Priority rank for fac-
Ž .tory yields, and v Tube performance in comparison
Ž .to competitors. Flexibility FLEXIBILITY is mea-
sured as the extent of tube variety possible at the
Žfactory recoded to a 5-point scale from original
. Ž .data . Price PRICE is also a single-item measure
based on a comparison of the price relative to com-
petitors. New productrprocess innovation capability
Ž .INNOVATE is measured as the average of the
Ž . Ž .frequency of i new tubes or designs, ii product
Ž .design changes, and iii process design changes
Ž .Cronbach’s alpha of 0.7 . Finally, future leadership
Ž .in innovation LEAD-INNOVATOR is measured on
the basis of whether the factory general manager had
planned or had thought of introducing monitor tubes,
LCDs, andror flat-panel active matrix screens.
The second set of measures pertain to perfor-
Žmance both end outcomes and intermediate mea-
.sures . Two operations-related end outcomes are
measured—quality and productivity. Two measures
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of quality are used. The first is a yield indicator—the
Ž .average material consumption per 1000 good tubes
Ž .of four key tube components MAT-QUAL ; the
Ž .second is customer rejects REJECTS a self-re-
ported measure, which we corrected for regional
Ždifferences in standards though these differences are
.found to be minor . Productivity is measured as labor
productivity, in terms of average tubes produced per
labor-hour, with corrections being made for tube
Ž .size, and product mix PRODUCTIVITY . In addi-
tion, a number of bottom-line type measures, such as
Ž .return on investment or sales ROIrROS , are used.
A number of derived measures were also obtained,
e.g., improvement in reject rates over the past 4
Ž .years REJ-IMP . The intermediate performance
measures include measures such as work-in-process
inventory, equipment breakdowns, capacity utiliza-
tion, and manufacturing cycle time.
We draw upon several streams of literature to
identify the key factory practices. In particular, we
Žfocus on the quality literature Garvin, 1988; Benson
.et al., 1991 , the manufacturing strategy literature
Ž .Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984 , the manufacturing
Ž .productivity literature Schmenner, 1991 , and the
Žmanufacturing practices literature Schonberger,
.1986; Womack et al., 1990 . The factory practices
identified by these literature streams can be broadly
Žclassified into factory architecture e.g., automation
.level, manufacturing variety and factory practices.
Thus, we call the third set of measures factory
architecture variables. In addition to factors identi-
fied in prior research, we also describe the basic
structure of the factory as part of the factory ‘archi-
tecture’, by using such measures as age, capacity,
and product mix.
The fourth and final set of measures describe
factory management practices. For each of these
measures, the analysis presented in this paper uses
individual questionnaire items.
3. Results
3.1. Defining plant roles
Our cluster analysis leads to three resultant plant
role clusters that are described in Table 1, in terms of
Ž .their respective group centroid mean scores and the
Žstandard error the K-means method was invoked
.from SPSS for Windows, 1994 . This table also
depicts the probability that one or more of the cluster
means differs from another, for each of the five
competitive priorities. The clusters differ from each
other on three of the five competitive priorities at the
0.05 level of significance.
We describe these three clusters as ‘innovators’
Ž . Ž .34% , ‘improvers’ 34% , and ‘transitory multi-
Ž .focused’ 32% . Innovators emphasize new product
Žand process innovation and advanced innovation,
.though not significant , while paying reasonable at-
tention to quality, flexibility, and price. Improvers
focus on quality, while lagging on both innovation
and flexibility. Finally, transitory multi-focused try
to balance all competitive priorities, while not really
Ž .doing very well on any of them Skinner, 1974 . As
a result, these plants lag substantially on quality,
while being good on flexibility and average on inno-
vation. Thus, transitory multi-focused is not neces-
sarily bad, simply that these plants are not optimally
structured to be narrowly goal-oriented. Possibly,
Table 1
Competitive priorities by group: results of cluster analysis
Competitive priority Strategic plant role cluster Probability of F-ratio
1 2 3
Innovator Improver Multi-focused
Ž . Ž . Ž .QUALITY 3.5 2,3 4.1 1,3 1.5 1,2 0.00001
Ž . Ž . Ž .FLEXIBILITY 3.9 2,3 1.75 1 2.3 1 0.00001
PRICE 3.0 2.7 3.06 ns
Ž . Ž . Ž .INNOVATE 3.33 2,3 2.15 1 2.06 1 0.0003
LEAD-INNOVATOR 0.41 0.29 0.35 ns
Ž .Numbers in parentheses indicate cluster numbers from which cluster is different Scheffe pairwise test . nssNot significant. Bold numbers
indicate highest score for cluster on that particular priority.
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these plants are undergoing some form of transition,
or view the priorities as a tradeoff. Further analysis
of these three clusters is presented in Section 3.3,
where we compare performance and practices for
these three groups.
3.2. Regional comparisons on performance and
practices
Table 2 summarizes the regional comparisons of
performance based on location. Though we could not
obtain detailed cost data, the data on productivity,
quality, and customer rejects are reliable and enable
us to estimate regional performance. As Table 2
shows, plants in Japan still have a small lead in
Ž . Žterms of quality MAT-QUAL , productivity PRO-
. Ž .DUCTIVITY , and customer rejects REJECTS . The
big surprise for us is the excellent performance of
plants located in NICs. Furthermore, NIC-owned
plants actually had higher quality performance than
Japanese-owned plants. On all three dimensions
NIC-located plants are second only to Japanese
plants. On average, plants located in N. America and
Europe, even though several of these are Japanese
owned, do not perform as well as the plants located
in Japan or NICs. However, if one examines the
Žrates of improvement over the past 3–4 years e.g.,
.YLD-IMP , plants located in the NICs and N. Amer-
Žica and those owned by NIC and European compa-
.nies show the greatest improvements. This is consis-
tent with the growing emergence of NICs and the
ongoing rejuvenation of US plants. However, this
should also be viewed in the context of the quality
level from which the improvement is taking place
Ž .the overall yield in 1992, i.e., YLD_92 . Except for
ŽChinarRussia and Other where yields would be
lower than those shown in Table 2 after we correct
.for the lower standards , N. America had the lowest
yields in 1992; naturally, there was greater scope for
dramatic improvement.
Among bottom-line measures, capacity utilization
Ž .CAP-UTIL , is an interesting measure in that it
reflects local political and economic conditions as
much as anything else. The high ChineserUSSR
capacity utilization is a result of centrally controlled
quotas, and even overproduction; on the other hand,
the high N. American figures reflect industry under
capacity, suppression of imports due to import du-
Table 2
Ž .Factory performance by region by location
Performance measure Region of location Probability of F-ratio
1 2 3 4 5 6
N. America Europe Japan NICs ChinarRussia Other
w x w x w x w x w x w x10 9 8 18 5 4
End outcomes
Ž .MAT-QUAL ar1000 tubes 1090 1106 1045 1071 1121 1127 ns
Ž .REJECTS ppm 4152 3922 2525 3666 10,000 6324 0.10
Ž .PRODUCTIVITY Tubesrman-h 1.22 1.27 1.75 1.31 0.27 0.49 0.028
Ž .YLD_92 % 73.7 81.0 86.2 83.1 75.2 76.4 ns
Ž .YLD-IMP %ryear 4.96 1.14 0.51 2.1 1.09 1.60 ns
Intermediate
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .W-I-P hours 27.8 5 53.3 16.9 5 24.5 5 220 1,3,4 75 0.026
Ž .CYCLE TIME hours 18.1 21.2 16.7 19.3 26 23 ns
SCREEN EQUIPMENT DOWNrwk 3.1 5.4 2.9 4.3 5.1 3.0 ns
EXHAUST EQUIPMENT DOWNrwk 0.6 1.51 0.51 0.51 2.6 0.75 ns
Ž .DURABILITY hours 22,128 18,778 24,375 19,588 13,200 12,667 ns
Bottom line
Ž .ROI % 6.9 1.2 6.16 1.63 14.3 9.9 ns
Ž .CAP-UTIL % 91.4 85.1 88 80.7 98.7 68.7 ns
Number of plants in each region are given in brackets. Numbers in parentheses indicate region numbers from which the region is different
Ž .Scheffe pairwise test . nssNot significant. Bold numbers indicate the two best scores on that particular performance measure.
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ties, and the economic upturn in 1992–1993. Return-
Ž .on-investment ROI is, not surprisingly, highest for
plants located in ChinarRussia and Other regions
Ž . Ž .IndiarS. America 10–14% . The first is likely a
result of government price setting, while the latter
reflects the limited capacity and expanding demand.
Among the developed economies, factories in Japan
Ž .and N. America show the highest ROI 6–7% ,
while NIC and European factories have the lowest
Ž .ROI 1–2% . The low ROI of NIC and European
factories can be explained by recent capital invest-
ments. NIC plants, in particular, appear to have
made investments for the long term. The results on
intermediate performance measures show insignifi-
cant differences across N. America, Europe, Japan,
and NICs; the only notable result is the low work-
in-process in Japanese and NIC plants. Overall, plants
located in or owned by ChineserUSSR or other
countries still lag substantially behind the other four
regions.
A few measures do stand out and deserve expla-
nation. Japanese plants have the lowest work-in-pro-
cess inventories, even though picture tube manufac-
turing is not a typical Toyota Production System
Ž .i.e., kanbans and just-in-time type of setting. When
it comes to equipment and maintenance issues
Ž .‘screen or exhaust equipment down’ , Japanese
plants are the leaders, with NIC and N. American
plants lagging behind. European plants are next on
these measures with the remaining plants in
ChinarRussia and other regions constituting the tail
of the distribution.
Table 3 presents regional comparisons for factory
priorities. The data indicate that Japanese plants
Ž .emphasize quality QUALITY more than other re-
gions. NIC and European plants do not emphasize
Ž .quality as much. Flexibility FLEXIBILITY appears
to be a higher priority for N. American and Japanese
plants. European plants’ lower emphasis on flexibil-
ity may be the result of a tendency to focus individ-
ual factories on either large or small tubes. When it
Ž .comes to innovation INNOVATE —the ability and
intent to make ongoing improvements in product and
process design—Japanese plants are the clear lead-
ers, with the plants in N. America, Europe, and NICs
forming the second group, and the rest of the world
making up the last group. Due to the fact that this
industry is on the verge of a technological disconti-
nuity, another dimension of competition is the ability
Žto be a leader in such advanced innovations LEAD-
.INNOVATOR . Here too, Japanese plants lead the
others, but NIC plants demonstrate a clear desire to
Ž .leapfrog the current leaders. Finally, price PRICE
is another key competitive priority in this industry,
and here, there is surprisingly equal emphasis
throughout the world, except for plants in India and
S. America, which are focused on low price.
Factory architectures vary throughout the world
Ž .Table 4a . For color tubes, NIC factories are the
youngest in the world—8 years—compared to 23
for Japanese, 20 for N. American and European, and
less than 15 for the others. In general, we found that
NIC, N. American, and Chinese factories have the
newest equipment. This is primarily because of re-
cently established new factories, as in NICs, or
installation of new equipment, as in N. America and
China. US factories make the largest tubes on aver-
age. Japanese factories have a surprisingly low aver-
Table 3
Ž .Factory priorities by region by location
Priorities Region of location Probability of F-ratio
1 2 3 4 5 6
N. America Europe Japan NICs ChinarRussia Other
QUALITY 3.3 2.33 4 2.9 3.7 2.3 0.087
FLEXIBILITY 2.9 2.22 3.75 2.3 2.2 2.2 0.094
PRICE 2.9 3 3 3 3.2 2.3 ns
INNOVATE 2.37 2.5 3.29 2.39 2.2 1.6 ns
LEAD-INNOVATOR 0.3 0.18 0.5 0.43 0.27 0.25 0.066
Bold numbers indicate top two regions on that particular priority. One-way ANOVA results indicate differences across regions. nssNot
significant.
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Table 4
Ž . Ž .a Factory architecture by region by location
Region of location Probability of
F-ratio
1 2 3 4 5 6
N. America Europe Japan NICs Chinar Russia Other
Factory architecture
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .AGE-COLOR years 18.3 20 4,5 22.7 4,5 7.3 2,3 10.8 2,3 14.5 0.0006
Ž .CAPACITY million unitsryear 2.0 2.2 2.6 2.6 1.8 1.3 ns
Ž .EQUIPMENT AGE years 8.9 11.7 10.1 8.86 6.2 11.7 ns
Ž .AVG-SIZE cm 64.0 54.2 47.9 43.1 46.7 47.1 ns
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .TOTAL EMPLOYEES 1162 5 1209 5 1683 1426 5 4552 1,2,4 1452 0.002
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .DIRECT EMPLOYEES 796 5 872 5 790 5 917 5 2790 1,2,3,4 919 0.002
Ž . Ž . Ž .TUBE-VARIETY no. 2.5 2.9 3.2 5 2.3 2.0 3 2.3 0.018
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .CUSTOMERS a plants 10 23 1 23 1 31 1 22 1 16 0.02
Automation
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .% Totally automated 55.8 49.4 78.8 5,6 61.3 5,6 36.1 3,4 4.8 all 0.001
Ž .Perceived scale 1–5 3.6 3.4 4.0 3.6 3.0 2.3 ns
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Manual handle—tube 7.4 10 6 2.9 2,5,6 8.9 13.5 3 17.0 3 0.008
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Manual handle—mask 4.8 5,6 7.1 2.3 5,6 6.7 15.0 1,3 18.3 1,3 0.0007
Ž .Numbers in parentheses indicate region numbers from which the region is different Scheffe pairwise test . nssNot significant.
Ž . Ž .b Factory practices by region by location
Factory practices
Process management
Root cause analysis information 15.6 62.2 66.3 47.4 48 59 0.03
for reject tubes
Vendor quality practices
Purchasing’s familiarity with 3.1 3.2 3.0 2.4 2.4 3.0 0.10
quality information
Quality department involved— 80% 73% 36% 70% 70% 70% ns
vendor selection
Frequency of supplier— 27 36 39 59 17 49 ns
engineering meeting
Technology management
% Problems solved by worker– 12 19.4 22.5 14.1 12 8.3 ns
supervisor team
% Problems solved by 30.0 24.4 20.9 17.1 24.0 35.0 0.10
manufacturing engineers
% Problems solved by senior 9:0 13.3 11.3 8.8 25.0 11.7 0.08
managers
No. process improvement 14.7 17.8 27.4 36.9 10.8 14.33 ns
experiments
)Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .No. production engineers in 8 3,5 19.3 5 40.3 1,5 25.6 5 207 all 15 15 0.0066
manufacturing
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .No. production engineers in 10.1 5 19.1 5 43.8 5 38.2 5 104 5 3,5 0.0016
engineering
No. design engineers 23.4 15.1 39.6 40.2 43.4 6.3 ns
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .% Production engineers are 87 2,3 40 1,5,6 21 1,4,5,6 64 5,6 79 2,3,4 93 2,3,4 0.0001
degreed
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Ž .Table 4 continued
Region of location Probability of
F-ratio
1 2 3 4 5 6
N. America Europe Japan NICs Chinar Russia Other
Design management
Prototypes at factory for design 192 506 101 491 na na ns
changes
Ž . Ž .No. of weeks for design changes 12.9 3 10.6 3.2 1,6 6.3 na na 0.0015
Prototypes in lab for new design 49 439 66 67 na na ns
No. of weeks—new design 30 29 8 25 na na 0.10
implementation
Commn. between design and 4.0 4.3 4.5 3.9 na na ns
productionrquality
Use of design tools 2.7 3.2 3.4 2.8 na na 0.10
Workforce management
Prev. Maintenance by 31 28.33 32.13 57.22 30.0 10.0 0.046
Ž .workers %
Ž .Setups by workers % 51.5 23.33 42.5 30.83 28.0 28.8 ns
Ž .Shop-floor procedures by workers % 26.5 16.67 32.5 47.78 4.4 30.0 0.10
Ž .Multiskilled workers % 43.5 28.67 57.5 41.9 16.0 21.25 0.09
Ž .Worker training hours h 53 59 59 49 111 39 ns
Ž .Absenteeism % 7.4 6.7 1.2 7.8 2.3 9.2 ns
Ž .Employee wages scale 3.0 3.2 3.9 3.1 y y 0.10
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .% In teams 32.0 3 32.6 3 92.5 1,2,6 58.4 33.0 27.5 3 0.003
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .No. years teams used years 3.0 3 5.1 12.8 4.6 3 2.2 3 2.1 3 0.002
Ž .1,4,5,6
Ž . Ž . Ž .Number of suggestionsremployee 13.6 1.4 5,6 32.4 12.0 78.1 2 167.2 2 0.05
Strategic quality management
Top management evaluates 4.2 3.89 4.25 4.1 3.8 3.75 ns
managers on quality
Quality incentives for workers 2.4 2.89 3.63 3.77 4.0 2.25 0.0325
Factory network learning
% Quality ideas from other plants 36 28 20 30 na na ns
Frequency plant manager visits to 3 3.5 4.8 3.4 na na ns
sisters plants
Frequency production manager 1.6 2.8 8.3 4.0 na na 0.027
visits to sister plants
Frequency quality manager visits 2.1 2.6 13.3 6.7 na na 0.044
to sister plants
Frequency production engineer 1.7 3.1 8.8 6.2 na na ns
visits to sister plants
Ž .Numbers in parentheses indicate region numbers from which the region is different Scheffe pairwise test . nssNot significant. Bold
numbers are two best scores for each practice. nasNot Applicable; ysData not available.
) cf. footnote 3.
age tube size, possibly because they manufacture a
large range of tube sizes, including some very small
tube sizes, e.g., 10 in. The average size for European
factories is low because of the inclusion of a couple
of factories that focus on the East European market
for small tubes. Japanese factories also produce on
average the most tube sizes per factory and on any
Ž .one line 3.2 sizes per line which is consistent with
their emphasis on flexibility. Yet, NIC factories serve
the largest number of customers.
Japanese and NIC factories have the highest
equipment automation, with Japanese factories hav-
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Table 5
Factory performance by cluster group
Performance measure Strategic plant role cluster Probability of F-ratio
1 2 3
Innovator Improver Multi-focused
w x w x w x17 17 16
End-outcomes
Ž .MAT-QUAL ar1000 tubes 1058 1094 1105 0.10
Ž . Ž . Ž .REJECTS ppm 3930 2924 3 4862 2 0.04
Ž .PRODUCTIVITY Tubesrman-h 1.65 1.07 1.15 ns
YLD_92 86.0 81.0 75.0 0.10
Ž .YLD-IMP %ryear 1.35 1.92 3.0 ns
Intermediate
Ž .W-I-P hours 33 43 36 ns
Ž .CYCLE TIME hours 18.8 26.7 21.0 ns
Ž . Ž . Ž .SCREENING EQUIPMENT DOWNrwk 1.9 3 3.5 3 6.9 1,2 0.0014
EXHAUST EQUIPMENT DOWNrwk 0.3 0.73 1.17 0.099
Ž . Ž .DURABILITY 24,689 3 19,588 16,076 1 0.06
Bottom-line
Ž .ROI % 7.6 2.5 4.65 ns
Ž .CAP-UTIL. % 83.6 87.0 86.1 ns
The number of plants within each cluster are given in brackets. Numbers in parentheses indicate cluster numbers from which the cluster is
Ž .different Scheffe pairwise test . nssNot significant. Bold numbers indicate highest performing cluster on that particular performance
measure.
ing the least amount of manual handling. Not surpris-
ingly, several of the Chinese factories are set up to
be highly automated, but still have substantial man-
ual handling. The above numbers change somewhat
when the factories are grouped by ownership rather
than location. N. American- and European-owned
factories are the oldest. The newest equipment is in
plants owned by NIC, Japanese, and Chinese compa-
nies. NIC-owned plants make somewhat smaller tube
sizes than Japanese or N. AmericanrEuropean-
owned plants. Japanese-owned plants outside or
within Japan manufacture the most variety of tube
sizes. The pattern of automation by ownership is
similar to that for location, except that Japanese-
owned plants have a substantial lead over NICs as
well.
Numerous comparisons of management and fac-
Žtory practices may be drawn from these data Table
.4b . However, given space limitations, we present
only the key observations. Most regions appear to be
equal on top management emphasis, except that in
some regions this emphasis manifests itself in the
form of financial and other incentives for quality and
other objectives. NIC and Japanese factories appear
to emphasize learning and technical knowledge, as
indicated by the emphasis on experimentation and
problem-solving at all levels, as well as the large
number of engineers employed. 4 Also, surprisingly,
NIC factories appear to be at par with Japanese
Ž .factories and ahead of the other regions in adopting
state-of-the-art workforce practices such as multi-
skilled workers, broad worker responsibilities, and
Žthe use of teams also see Whybark and Vastag,
.1993 . Thus, overall, Japanese and NIC factories
appear to be the most progressive on factory man-
agement practices.
The above results suggest that Predictions 1a and
1b are not fully supported, and in fact, are partially
4 Chinese factories actually report that they have more engi-
neers, but that is partly the result of the Chinese educational and
vocational system which produces surplus engineers, coupled with
the fact that there is no clear distinction between technicians and
engineers. Also, the current start-up phase of most Chinese facto-
ries typically engages several dozen foreign engineers on site.
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Table 6
Ž .a Factory architecture by cluster group
Strategic plant role cluster Probability of F-ratio
1 2 3
Innovator Improver Multi-focused
Factory architecture
Ž .AGE-COLOR years 18 11 16 ns
Ž .CAPACITY million unitsryear 2.8 2.03 2.15 0.10
Ž .EQUIPMENT AGE years 9.9 8.8 10.6 ns
Ž .AVG-SIZE cm 53 47.8 49.9 0.048
TOTAL EMPLOYEES 1832 1105 1718 ns
DIRECT EMPLOYEES 1003 699 1146 ns
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .TUBE-VARIETY no. 4.1 2,3 1.8 1 2.3 1 0.00001
Ž . Ž . Ž .CUSTOMERS a plants 37 2 16 1 25 0.04
Automation
Ž . Ž . Ž .% Totally automated closed loop control 56 73 3 39 2 0.0036
Ž . Ž .Automation—relative perception 1–5 scale 4.06 3 3.59 2.75 0.0048
Ž . Ž . Ž .Manual handle—tube a times 4.35 3 9.25 12.9 1 0.0066
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Manual handle—Mask a times 3.4 3 5.3 3 10.5 1,2 0.0019
Ž .Automation of data collection 1–5 scale 3.12 3.3 2.8 ns
Ž .Numbers in parentheses indicate cluster numbers from which the cluster is different Scheffe pairwise test . nssNot significant.
Ž .b Factory practices by cluster group
Factory practice
Process management
Root cause analysis information for reject tubes 60% 36% 46% 0.10
Vendor quality practices
Purchasing’s familiarity with quality information 2.7 2.9 2.9 ns
Quality department involved—vendor selection 59 69 77 ns
Frequency of supplier—engineer meeting 46 44 42 ns
Technology management
% Problems solved by production workers and 19 15.3 10 0.10
supervisors in teams
% Problems solved by manufacturing engineers 19.5 20 30 0.047
% Problems solved by senior managers 12.5 12.1 9.7 ns
Ž . Ž .No. process improvement experiments 39 2 12.5 1 24.8 0.07
Ž . Ž .No. production engineers in manufacturing 48.3 3 22.2 8.9 1 0.05
No. production engineers in engineering 42.2 28.1 17.2 ns
No. design engineers 42.4 20.5 23.4 ns
% Production engineers are degreed 44.5 69.8 63.4 0.10
Design management
Prototypes at factory for design changes 223 514 247 ns
No. of weeks for design changes 5.3 8.3 11.9 0.02
Prototypes in lab for new design 61.8 84.7 246 ns
No. of weeks—new design implementation 17.1 26.4 25.7 ns
Commn. between design and productionrquality 4.6 4.1 3.9 0.07
Use of design tools 3.2 2.6 2.9 ns
Workforce management
Ž .Preventive maintenance by workers % 41 43 23 0.10
Ž .Setups by workers % 40 40 25 ns
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Ž .Table 6 continued
Strategic plant role cluster Probability of F-ratio
1 2 3
Innovator Improver Multi-focused
Ž .Shop-floor procedures by workers % 29 44 16 0.07
Ž .Multiskilled workers % 45 44 27 ns
Ž .Worker training hours h 50 75 49 ns
Ž .High school education % 68.5 64.5 40 0.05
Ž .Recruitment based on education scale 4.35 4.0 3.5 0.09
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Absenteeism % 2.7 3 3.5 3 10.1 1,2 0.0013
Ž .Employee wages scale 3.35 3.4 3.0 ns
Ž .Few status differences 3.5 3 3.4 3.0 ns
% In teams 62 58 33 0.078
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .No. years teams used years 9.3 2,3 3.5 1 4.0 1 0.0037
Number of suggestionsremployee 52.5 12 5.5 0.10
Strategic quality management
Top management evaluates managers on quality 3.67 3.62 3.2 ns
Quality incentives for workers 3.4 3.8 2.6 0.10
Ž . Ž .Managers do not cooperate 2.4 3 2.8 3.3 1 0.036
Factory network learning
% Quality ideas from other plants 18.6 38.4 30.8 0.10
Frequency plant manager visits to sister plants 4.1 3.1 3.05 ns
Frequency production manager visits to sister plants 5.7 3.1 1.9 0.06
Frequency quality manager visits to sister plants 10.1 3.8 2.65 0.028
Frequency production engineer visits to sister plants 6.6 3.16 3.23 0.10
Ž .Numbers in parentheses indicate cluster numbers from which the cluster is different Scheffe pairwise test . nssNot significant. Bold
numbers indicate best score on that particular practice.
disconfirmed. On Prediction 1a, there appears to be a
convergence on many dimensions such as top man-
agement emphasis on quality, worker training, and
recruitment practices. Contrary to expectations, NICs
are better than average on both process performance
and innovation. In fact, they are reasonably good,
and have been improving for the past few years even
though on factory priorities, they still appear to lag,
and are possibly trying to understand what they
should emphasize. Japanese plants are leaders on
both innovation and process performance, which re-
inforces the commonly voiced belief that Japanese
plants have taken the lead from US and European
plants. Prediction 1b is supported to the extent that
Japanese plants are leaders on both technology and
management practices, while, contrary to expecta-
tions, NICs are at par with or better than European
and N. American plants. In fact, NICs score among
Žthe top two on nine of 17 practices compared to 13
of 17 for Japanese, five of 17 for N. American, and
.three of 17 for European plants .
3.3. Comparing performance and practices across
plant roles
Table 5 presents a comparison of performance by
cluster group. For the end outcome performance
measures, it is evident that innovators are the supe-
rior performers on almost every count: best on inter-
Ž .nal quality MAT-QUAL ; a close second best on
Ž .external quality REJECTS ; and, highest on produc-
Ž .tivity PRODUCTIVITY . This is surprising, given
the traditionally observed tradeoff between innova-
Žtion and constant performance see, e.g., Hambrick,
1983 for evidence on the superior performance of
businesses that are ‘defenders’ and ‘analyzers’ in
.contrast to the average performance of ‘innovators’ .
Possibly, the emphasis on innovation at the plant
level has learning benefits that overcome the draw-
Ž .backs of ‘confusion’ Hayes and Clark, 1986 . The
improvers seem to do consistently well on all qual-
ity-related dimensions. In fact, they have the best
customer quality performance, though they lag on
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Table 7
Results of canonical discriminant analysis
Canonical function Eigen value Canonical correlation Significance of canonical correlation Percent of variance
or root
a Name
1 quality improvement 2.466 0.84 -0.00001 57.16
2 customer scope 1.848 0.81 -0.00001 42.84
Predictor set Canonical correlation Canonical coefficient
Function 1 Function 2 Function 1 Function 2
QUALITY 0.97 y0.07 1.0169 y0.1567
FLEXIBILITY 0.055 0.72 y0.0031 0.9399
INNOVATE 0.15 0.436 0.1650 0.7228
LEAD-INNOVATOR y0.025 0.15 y0.1264 y0.1924
PRICE y0.08 0.11 0.2082 0.2116
Ž .Bold numbers indicate high loadings weights in canonical functions q0.40.
Ž .Wilk’s Lambdas0.351. F-statistic for Wilk’s Lambdas47.11 p-0.00001 .
productivity. This possibly reflects a distinct focus
on quality where no compromises are made, and is
possibly an intermediate phase in a transition to-
wards plants that can simultaneously achieve high
Žquality and productivity see, e.g., the sandcone
. 5model of Ferdows and de Meyer, 1990 . Finally,
multi-focused plants lag on almost every dimension,
Ž .except on yield improvements YLD-IMP . This is
possibly because they have the greatest scope for
Žimproving YLD_92, i.e., the overall yield in 1992 is
.lowest for these plants .
The comparison of factory architecture and prac-
Ž .tices by cluster group Table 6a and b shows a
number of expected, as well as surprising patterns.
As expected, innovators produce larger tubes, have
the greatest tube variety, the most customers, and are
fairly automated. It appears that these factories have
Žpartial automation so that it is not ‘totally’ auto-
mated, but the overall automation is still higher than
most other plants; this is possibly why these factories
perceive themselves to be more highly automated
.than improver plants . Improver factories are highly
5 The sandcone model suggests that manufacturing capabilities
develop in a cumulative fashion, starting with quality, and then
gradually adding on other capabilities until the business has other
capabilities as well, such as delivery, flexibility, and price.
Žautomated on both total automation as well as the
.self-perception scale . Consistent with their quality
focus, improvers have the best workforce practices,
are employee focused, and conduct continuous im-
provement through inter-plant learning and transfer
of best practices. Innovators focus on technological
issues more than the other groups: they conduct
many experiments, have a highly skilled technical
Ž .workforce both engineers and workers , and are
cross-functional in their problem-solving approach.
They make the best use of teams: possibly, being
innovators, the use of administrative innovations
comes easily to them.
3.4. Canonical discriminant functions that explain
plant roles
We carried out a canonical discriminant analysis
using the discriminant option in SPSS for Windows
to describe the key factory capabilities and priorities
Žthat explain the above clustering Green, 1978;
.Klecka, 1980; Tabachnik and Fidell, 1983 . Given
our sample size, and the number of clusters, two key
Ž .discriminant functions were identified Table 7a,b .
These functions explain the clusters with a 98%
accuracy or hit rate. As Table 7a shows, two signifi-
cant canonical functions are identified, with innova-
tion and quality being the two competitive priorities
that are most significant in describing the canonical
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Fig. 2. Mapping plants and group centroids onto canonical function coordinates.
functions. The canonical correlations of 0.84 and
Ž0.81 indicate that about 64% average of square of
.0.84 and 0.81 of the variance in plant role group
membership is explained by the 5 competitive priori-
Ž .ties and vice versa . The overall significance of the
multivariate relationship between the competitive
priorities and the canonical functions is indicated by
Ž .the F statistic for Wilk’s Lambda: Us0.351, p F
-0.00001. Thus, both discriminant functions are
Žsignificant and have discriminating power Klecka,
.1980, p. 38 .
The first canonical function appears to be a ‘qual-
ity improvement’ dimension that describes a plant’s
desire to achieve high quality. It is highly positively
correlated with quality and very moderately with
innovation. The second function is clearly focused
on innovation and variety, driven by, what we call
‘customer scope’. It represents a plant’s desire to
have a broad, innovative product offering, and its
attempt to meet customer requirements to the extent
possible. Though somewhat similar to Miller and
Roth’s ‘market scope’ function, ‘customer scope’,
appropriately so, has more of a factory manufactur-
ing emphasis. This function has high positive corre-
lations with both innovation and flexibility, and a
moderate correlation with both advanced innovation
leadership and price. Thus, plants that emphasize
quality are likely to be classified as ‘quality im-
provement’ plants. On the other hand, plants focus-
ing on innovation and variety or flexibility are likely
to have a high score on ‘customer scope’. Fig. 2
maps plants onto the two plant role discriminant
functions of ‘quality improvement’ and ‘customer
scope’. The centroids of each of the three clusters,
innovators, improvers, and multi-focused are marked
as ‘)’.
3.5. Global distribution of plant roles
Table 8a and b present results of a cross-tabula-
tion of plant groups by region. Table 8a presents the
results where region represents location, and for
Table 8b, region means ownership.
These results clearly do not support Prediction 2.
Neither the distribution of plants across a particular
strategic plant role cluster, nor within a particular
Ž .region by location or by ownership , support the
Žpatterns expected if Prediction 2 is true here, we use
the classification of ‘marketeers’ and ‘caretakers’ in
prior research to be a more generic classification,
somewhat parallel to our categories of improvers and
.multi-focused; cf. Prediction 2. None of the plants
located in Japan, or owned by Japanese companies is
multi-focused. Plants in Japan have the highest
Ž .propensity to be innovators six of eight, i.e., 75% ,
Ž .followed by NICs 37% , and N. American plants
Ž .30% . The same numbers by ownership are 47% for
Japan, 37% for NICs, and 20% for N. American- and
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Table 8
Ž . Ž .a Crosstabs of cluster group by region by location
Region Strategic plant role cluster Total
1 2 3
Innovator Improver Multi-focused
Ž .1 N. America 3 4 3 10
Ž .2 Europe 1 2 6 9
Ž .3 Japan 6 2 0 8
Ž .4 NICs 5 7 4 16
Ž .5 ChinarRussia 1 2 0 3
Ž .6 Others 1 0 3 4
Total 17 17 16 50 of 54
Ž . Ž .b Crosstabs of cluster group by region by ownership
Ž .1 N. AmericarEurope 3 3 9 15
Ž .3 Japan 9 10 0 19
Ž .4 NICs 4 2 5 11
Ž .5 ChinarRussia 1 2 0 3
Ž .6 Others 0 0 2 2
Total 17 17 16 50 of 54
European-owned plants. 6 Plants located in and
owned by European and N. American companies
exhibit a high propensity to be multi-focused; nine of
19 plants located in the Western world, and nine of
15 plants owned by Western companies fall in this
Žcategory recall that we mentioned earlier that being
.multi-focused is not necessarily bad .
The plants located in or owned by the NICs
display a mix among innovators, improvers, and
multi-focused, showing an evolutionary phase in
which there is no consistent pattern of plant roles for
the region. However, five or six plants located in
Ž .NICs but not owned by NICs are improvers. This
means that Japanese or Western MNCs seem to be
following the IPUP models to some extent, that is,
not giving these plants an innovator role, thought
still letting them be improvers. This is possibly the
result of TQM efforts. Further support comes from
the fact that of the eight innovators among
Japanese-owned plants, five are in Japan itself. This
confirms the popular view that Japanese companies
6 The high fraction of innoÕator plants among NICs, and the
correspondingly small number of multi-focused plants for NICs,
suggests that NICs may have leapfrogged a management paradigm,
directly going from having no presence in the industry only a few
years ago to being among the industry leaders.
first carry out development and experiments in their
home plants, and then ‘export’ these technologies to
their overseas plants. This finding is not totally
Žconsistent with Ferdows’ prediction our Prediction
.3 that over time, overseas plants will come to play a
‘lead’ role.
The results for the other regional groups are not
surprising. None of the plants owned or located in
non-NIC Asia or in S. America plays an innovator
role. Among the plants in China and the ex-USSR,
only one is multi-focused. There is one innovator,
which is a slight surprise, yet, many political scien-
tists, political economists, and country culture ‘gurus’
are willing to bet that China will not only be the
fastest growing economy in the next couple of
decades, but also that Chinese-owned companies can
Žbe expected to revolutionize world economics see,
.e.g., Overholt, 1993 .
Our analysis of plant roles on the basis of whether
they are in the ‘home’ country or region, or ‘away’,
provides less rigorous results because the sample
sizes are small. Table 9a and b suggests that if the
primary role of ‘lead’ plants is to be innovators, then
‘home’ plants have a larger fraction of innovators
Ž .than ‘away’ plants 12 of 28 vs. 4 of 17 . Surpris-
ingly, however, this is not true for N. American and
European plants. Thus, Prediction 3a is only partially
Žsupported. Most ‘away’ plants are improvers 10 of
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Table 9
Ž . Ž .a Plant roles by ‘Home’ or ‘Away’ ‘Home’s Home country; ‘Away’snot in home country
Region Home or away Strategic plant role cluster Total plants
1 2 3
Innovator Improver Multi-focused
Ž .1 N. America Home 0 0 1 1
Away 0 0 0 0
Ž .2 Europe Home 1 0 2 3
Away 2 3 6 11
Ž .3 Japan Home 6 2 0 8
Away 3 8 0 11
Ž .4 NICs Home 4 2 3 9
Away 0 0 2 2
Ž . Ž .b Plant roles by ‘Home Region’ or ‘Away Region’ ‘Home’sHome region; ‘Away’snot in home region
Ž .1 N. America Home 0 0 1 1
Away 0 0 0 0
Ž .2 Europe Home 2 1 6 9
Away 1 2 2 5
Ž .3 Japan Home 6 2 0 8
Away 3 8 0 11
Ž .4 NICs Home 4 2 4 10
Away 0 0 1 1
.17 , though these are mostly Japanese-owned plants.
Multi-focused plants exist both at ‘home’ and ‘away’.
Though our cluster analysis does not match Fer-
dows’ categories of plant roles, and thus Predictions
3b and 3c cannot be evaluated directly, the fact that
every multiplant MNC has a different distribution of
roles, for ‘home’ and ‘away’ plants, suggests that
these predictions do not hold completely. In particu-
lar, several innovators exist among ‘away’ plants,
thus contradicting Prediction 3c. Further, we could
not test the prediction about the evolution of plant
roles. Thus, Predictions 3a, 3b and 3c are only
partially supported.
4. Discussion
Our arguments and empirical results suggest that
the IPUP models need to be reassessed and extended.
Changes in economic factors and management prac-
tices contribute to the limited relevance of these
traditional internationalization models. These include
the growing convergence of factor cost configura-
Žtions of various national markets Vernon, 1981;
.Porter, 1990 , technology transfer activities within
ŽMNCs Vernon, 1981; Flaherty, 1986; Bartlett and
.Ghoshal, 1989 , and the global awareness and adop-
Ž .tion of management knowledge Young, 1992 . As
the discussion below indicates, several of these rea-
sons are interrelated, and it is the simultaneous evo-
lution of several of these, that possibly explains why
the IPUP models are no longer strongly supported.
4.1. Possible explanations
One possible explanation of the narrowing of this
performance gap among plants derives from the ob-
servation that whereas industrialized countries seek
Žnatural resources or low cost labor i.e., those re-
sources in which their countries may be disadvan-
.taged , developing countries often seek to acquire
technology, the resource in which they are compara-
Ž .tively poorly endowed see Dunning, 1988, p. 15 .
Over time, firms from NICs, LDCs and developing
countries gradually acquire technology and skills,
and if they have the opportunity, may achieve higher
performance than industrialized countries. This argu-
Ž .ment is supported by Schmenner and Rho 1990 ,
who found a strong technology emphasis by Korean
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plants. In fact, it is now a widely held belief that
many of the countries in the world are catching up.
As Hamel and Prahalad suggest, this is to be ex-
pected in a world where capital, technology, and
Žmanagerial talent are internationally mobile Hamel
.and Prahalad, 1994 . They argue that ‘‘ . . . The unfet-
tered capitalism of the Chinese Diaspora in Taiwan,
Hong Kong, and southern China has produced an
economic miracle every bit the equal of Japan’s . . . ’’
Ž .Hamel and Prahalad, 1994, p. 269 . A similar con-
clusion is echoed by the International Motor Vehicle
Ž .Program IMVP research on the auto industry
Ž .Womack et al., 1990 : the traditional view, whereby
the ‘‘ . . . world economy advanced by moving the
production of standardized, low-priced products—
such as small automobiles and trucks—to new
mass-production factories in newly industrializing
countries . . . ’’, clashes with the push towards lean
Ž .production worldwide Womack et al., 1990, p. 260 .
This, they predict, will lead to a new world eco-
nomic order in which there will be greater equality,
and, as a result, an increased flow of products, but
overall a regional balance of trade flows. The Korean
auto industry confirms this view. Starting as low-cost
exporters, Korean auto producers are beginning to
compete on quality and performance, and have estab-
lished production facilities in the US and Europe.
‘‘ . . . The idea of a company from a developing
country building a major manufacturing facility in a
highly developed, high-wage country would have
Ž .been unthinkable . . . ’’ Womack et al., 1990, p. 263 .
An important outcome of global competition, and
the pace of economic progress is that companies are
increasingly having to adopt a more ‘geocentric’
Ž . Ž . 7i.e., world-oriented approach Perlmutter, 1969 .
Here, it appears that actions are leading intents.
Thus, while Japanese auto companies were tradition-
Žally perceived to lack a global perspective Womack
.et al., 1990, p. 272 , their actions—investments,
technology transfer, component localization, and ex-
ports back to Japan—are indicative of a more geo-
centric outlook. This is confirmed by our global
color picture tube data: innovator plants exist in both
7 ŽPerlmutter describes three MNC attitudes—ethnocentric or
. Ž .home-country-oriented , polycentric or host-country-oriented ,
Ž .and geocentric or world-oriented .
Žhome countries and ‘away’ countries Table 9a and
.b .
This ‘geocentrism’ is closely connected with the
notion of MNCs as a network of resources that
Žrequire coordination Porter, 1986; Hedlund, 1986;
.Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989 . MNCs are projected to
be differentiated networks of independent but coordi-
Žnated resources for subsidiaries see, e.g., Bartlett
. Žand Ghoshal, 1989, p. 98 , or for plants see, e.g.,
.Ferdows, 1989 . Thus, the MNC’s global network
becomes one of interdependent and intelligent nodes,
rather than one where strategic functions are clearly
located in a center and the ‘foreign’ units are rele-
Žgated to implementing roles Hedlund, 1986; Bartlett
. 8and Ghoshal, 1989 . This is confirmed by our data
Ž .Table 9a,b . Yet, we found that these plant roles do
not follow Ferdows’ expectations about plant roles.
Two factors may explain this. First, increasing prod-
uct maturity and rapidly improving telecommunica-
tion make it less critical to have a short spatial
distance between production facilities and the corpo-
ration centers for decision-making and product de-
velopment. It is thus possible to have ‘lead’ plants
that are not in the MNC’s home country. Second,
these roles are redefined in the context of inter-re-
lated plant roles. Plants within a network can be
strategically designed to be centers of excellence on
different dimensions. This may preclude one plant
Ž .from being a ‘lead’ plant also, see Section 1.4 .
Another potential explanation for our results and
the partial disconfirmation of the IPUP model is the
growing convergence of management practices re-
sulting from the world-wide diffusion of manage-
Ž .ment principles associated with just-in-time JIT ,
Ž .total quality TQM , lean production, cross-func-
tional product development, and the use of
ŽCADrCAM Womack et al., 1990, pp. 227–255;
.Young, 1992; etc. . As such practices are adopted in
different parts of the world, the performance of
plants in different parts of the world can be expected
to converge. This is not to say that such practices are
easy to adopt and internalize: both the pace of
8 Yet, even today there is a contradicting model, the ‘home
base’ model. According to this model, the international dispersion
of creative and strategic assets is seen as mostly ineffective, and a
Ž .temporary side-effect of acquisition strategies see Porter, 1990 .
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Žchange, e.g., at Gateway 2000 Computers Agility
.Forum, 1995 and the ‘stickiness’ of such practices
explain the difficulty of transfer of best practices
Ž .von Hippel, 1994; Szulanski, 1995 .
4.2. Discussion of the current theory
While the IPUP models may have explained a
great deal about international product and production
loci in the past, the theory lacks adequate explana-
tory power today. Our analysis of regional differ-
ences in the global color picture tube industry pro-
vides evidence to this effect, and highlights limita-
tions to extant descriptive models in the operations
management literature. Further, the applicability of
the IPUP models appears to be limited if new prod-
ucts are developed in companies that already have
Žconsiderable operations in foreign countries also see
.Vernon, 1979; Melin, 1992, p. 103 .
We can begin to explain our results by extending
the notion of an investment development path or
Ž . Žcycle Dunning, 1986 . According to this as yet
.untested hypothesis:
Ž .FDI by or in a country ‘ . . . will vary according to i
Ž .its stage of economic development, ii the structure
Ž .of its factor endowments and markets, iii its politi-
Ž .cal and economic systems, and iv the nature and
extent of market failure in the transaction of interme-
Ždiate products across national boundaries . . . ’ Dun-
. 9ning, 1988, p. 15 .
9 The international development cycle model discussed above
is, in some ways, a restatement and reinterpretation of classical
theories of trade and international economics. Yet, given the
intersection of capitalism-based international economics and com-
munistrsocialist theories, we may see further exceptions to exist-
Ž .ing theories. For example, Ohmae 1995 predicts the emergence
of region–states such as Silicon Valley, San Diego–Tijuana,
northern Italy, Baden–Wurttemberg, Singapore, Osaka–Kansai,
Bangalore in India, and Hong Kong–southern China. Overholt
suggests that China has reversed the traditional non-capitalist
economic policy by putting light industry before heavy, and using
Žthe economic multiplier model to jump-start its economy Over-
.holt, 1993 . Thus, the Chinese strategy of focusing on light
industry, balancing government dictatorship with human resource
management, developing a flexible working relationship with
Hong Kong, and focusing on technical manpower for the future
will likely catapult it to global leadership in the early 21st century.
Ž .Similar projections have been made for India Ohmae, 1995 ,
Poland, the ex-East German region of Germany, and even Russia.
Thus, a country’s international FDI will pass
Žthrough a number of stages here, country refers to
.any country, not just industrialized countries . In
Stage One, there will be no FDI, in or out, due to the
lack of a political, commercial, and technological
infrastructure for markets and support services, and
the inability to leverage factor endowments. As the
infrastructure improves in Stage Two, intermediate
products will start to be imported, generally via the
internal mechanisms of multinational enterprises be-
cause the transaction costs of external markets are
too high. During Stage Three, the developing coun-
try’s firms start to generate their own ownership-
specific advantages, and may go abroad seeking
bigger markets, or supplementary resources. 10 At
this point, the developing country may be starting on
its journey to be a more developed and industrialized
country. Countries such as Japan in the 1960s and
1970s, and Korea and Taiwan in the 1980s and
1990s, appear to have gone through this cycle of
development. 11 Due to limitations of space, we do
not intend to describe how or why these countries
were able to trigger their investment development
Žpaths while others were not see, e.g., Heenan and
Keegan, 1979; Schumacher, 1975, 1989; Morita et
al., 1988; Womack et al., 1990, pp. 260–264; Woo-
.Choong, 1992 . However, our results indicate that
countries such as Korea and Taiwan do have supe-
rior practices and performance at the plant level, and
also assign different roles for different plants. That
is, they do not focus their plants simply to be
improvers, but also have plants that are innovators.
From an operations strategy standpoint, there are
unresolved conflicts between the internationalization
models and the notion of progression of capabilities.
10 Existing research indicates that a key reason for the interna-
tionalization of NIC companies is that NIC MNCs have better
production expertise and better technical support than the host
Ž .countries generally LDC and developing countries for low-tech-
nology products. Further, they tend to be more skillful than even
developed countries in designing machinery for flexible use, and
Ž .achieving high equipment utilization Lau, 1992 .
11 Ž .Lau 1992 finds that, like the IPLC model, overseas roles
tend to evolve over time: NIC MNCs tend to go from production
to sales to marketing, in their overseas ventures.
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Until about 10 years ago, operations and business
strategy researchers believed that there were trade-
Žoffs between various competitive priorities Skinner,
.1974, 1978; Porter, 1980 . This is also reflected in
the theories developed by international business re-
searchers, such as the notion that as the lifecycle
progressed, it became difficult for plants to compete
on more than just innovation, or quality, etc. Yet, if
we look at today’s technologies and management
approaches, it is becoming increasingly clear that
plants, business units, and companies can compete
Žon multiple priorities de Meyer et al., 1989; Fer-
dows and de Meyer, 1990; Hamel and Prahalad,
.1994 . This too, affects the nature of global strategy
models and the internationalization process. The abil-
ity of Japanese plants in the color picture tube
industry to simultaneously achieve innovation, con-
formance and cost excellence, is one indication of
the obsolescence of the notion of narrowly focused
priorities for factories or business units.
4.3. A need for new theory
The foregoing argues for substantial modifications
to existing IPUP models or the development of
Table 10
Old and new realities for defining plant roles in global manufacturing
Ž . Ž .IPUP models yesterday New models today
Ž . Ž .Primary drivers A. Access to local relative to plant location markets A. Access to markets local, regional or global
B. Access to raw materials, and low skill, low labor B. Access to raw materials, production capacity, highly
cost production capacity skilled or unskilled labor, and capital
ŽC. Leverage network effects e.g., within the company
.or with suppliers or customers
Implicit assump- A. Governments are neutral or ‘externalities’ A. Governments are active participants in defining
tions which, how and where products are made and sold
B. Consumer desires are bifurcated: ‘sophisticated’ in B. Many countries have both ‘sophisticated’ and
developed countries and ‘unsophisticated’ in less de- ‘unsophisticated’ consumers
veloped countries
C. Skills are bifurcated: high skilled and high cost in C. Highly skilled people are found in significant
developed countries; low skilled and low cost in less numbers in many less developed countries and low
developed countries skilled workers are found in large numbers in devel-
oped countries
D. Technological adaptation follows a predictable D. Both product and process technological adaptation
pattern can leap frog
E. Competition is not a critical factor in defining plant E. Global competitive dynamics should be considered
roles in defining idealized plant roles and do affect realized
roles
F. MNCs are centralized; headquarters control knowl- F. MNCs are a network of differentiated capabilities
edge and information, and are all-powerful
G. Product life cycles are long enough to enable G. Product life cycles for many products are extremely
internationalization process models to manifest them- short
selves
ŽTheoretical pre - A. Innovate at home i.e., do R&D in a developed A. Do critical R&D primarily but not exclusively in
. Ž .dictions and reali- country home country developed or less developed
ties
B. Use sophisticated process technologies at home, B. Use sophisticated process technologies at home and
outsource low tech labor intensive operations to less abroad; intentionally leapfrog when justified
developed countries; move mature technologies to less
developed countries
C. Treat plants as stand-alone or as part of vertically C. Treat plants as integral parts of value adding
integrated chain networks
D. Sell the most recently developed and sophisticated D. Sell most recently developed ‘global’ products
products at home, sell mature and simpler products in globally; leapfrog product classes when conditions
less developed countries justify
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fundamentally new theory. Although it is beyond the
scope of this paper to develop new theory, we pre-
sent a framework in Table 10—using the categories
DriÕers, Assumptions, Predictions and Realities—
that identifies major factors which we believe need
to be dealt with in new theory development.
DriÕers are the fundamental motivators for estab-
lishing plants outside a home country and making
product decisions. Good theory should make explicit
and justify what these drivers are. Excellent theory
should be able to differentiate between what man-
agers hope to do in this arena and what is realized.
Economists have, for good reasons, focused on the
realizations of FDI, etc., in IPUP theory develop-
ment, but in so doing may have missed answering
the ‘why’ question which we believe goes beyond
seeking factor price advantages. For example, market
and capacity aspirations are still important today, but
with far broader applicable definitions of ‘market’
and ‘capacity’ based on the often complex and some-
times seemingly convoluted arrangements companies
make today with customers and suppliers.
New theory should make its assumptions explicit
and consistent with today’s realities. A number of
Implicit Assumptions underlying IPUP theory that
were reasonably valid during the period 1950–1980
are very questionable today. For example, today
‘customers’ may be governments, competitors, or
large middle classes in NICs, demanding and willing
to pay for the latest in technology. Production
‘partners’ may be suppliers, governments or even
competitors. Instead of hand-me-down technology
transfer, some companies find it advantageous to
upgrade their NIC plants with the next generation
processes rather than implement them in their home
country plants. Leapfrogging in consumer markets
also takes place, e.g., NICs lacking a modern hard-
wired telecommunications infrastructure are bypass-
ing this technology in favor of cellular systems.
Theoretical Predictions and Reality highlight the
importance of predictive power to good theory, the
reasonableness of fit previously provided by IPUP
models, and the gap that now must be addressed by
alternative models. The new models must also elimi-
nate the ethnocentric bias inherent in the IPUP mod-
els. With the Chinese government owning plants in
the US, and South Korean companies owning plants
Žin Germany just two of many such examples of
NICs reversing the ‘normal’ IPUP investment pat-
.tern , the new models need to be geocentric in
orientation to have much predictive power.
5. Summary and conclusions
The structure and nature of global manufacturing
is changing and is not fully explained by existing
international economics, international business, or
operations strategy theories. Understanding this
change is necessary for both academics who desire
to conduct leading-edge research in this area, as well
as managers and firms who are involved with day-to-
day decision-making. While managerial and aca-
demic understanding of the realities of international
competition has gone beyond the IPUP models, the
theoretical and empirical bases have not progressed
Žmuch beyond these initial efforts a key exception is
.Porter, 1990 .
The IPUP models, as applied to manufacturing,
need to be modified in the context of global eco-
nomic changes, international factory roles, world-
wide diffusion of management knowledge, and the
increasing feasibility of achieving multiple competi-
tive priorities. This research provides a step in that
direction by combining viewpoints from interna-
tional business and operations strategy with detailed
empirical results from the global picture tube indus-
try.
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